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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the market reaction to the information released in security analyst
reports. It shows that the market reacts significantly and positively to changes in recommendation
levels, earnings forecasts, and price targets. While changes in price targets and earnings forecasts
both provide information to the market, revisions in price targets have a larger and more significant
impact than comparable revisions in earnings forecasts. The text of the report is also a significant
source of information as it provides the justifications supporting an analyst’s summary opinion.
When all of this information is considered simultaneously, some of it, notably the earnings forecasts,
is subsumed. The results further show that analysts correctly predict price targets slightly over 50%
of the time. Finally, the valuation methodology used does not seem to be correlated with either the
market’s reaction or the analyst’s accuracy.
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1. Introduction   
This paper investigates the association between market returns and the content of security 
analysts’ reports.  In addition, it provides the first detailed catalog of the elements in a typical 
analyst report.  An analyst’s report is the culmination of a process that includes the collection, 
evaluation, and dissemination of information related to a firm’s future performance.  The 
majority of these reports include three key summary elements: earnings forecasts, a stock 
recommendation - such as buy, sell, or hold - and a price target.  In addition, many reports 
present extensive quantitative and descriptive analysis supporting these summary elements.
1   
Previous research on analyst reports primarily examines revisions in only the first two 
summary elements: stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. We extend this research by 
incorporating the contents of analyst reports in their entirety rather than just individual elements 
such as the summary recommendation.  One problem in evaluating stock recommendations alone 
is that there are a limited number of recommendation levels.  For example, although analysts 
have five distinct recommendations - strong buy, buy, hold, sell, and strong sell - at their 
disposal, they are generally reluctant to use the two negative ratings.
2  By incorporating the 
gradations available in the analysts’ price targets and the reports’ contents, we overcome many 
of the disadvantages caused by the use of a few discrete recommendation categories.
3  Our 
approach to this analysis is captured by the quote “In the end, stock ratings and target prices are 
just the skin and bones of analysts’ research.  The meat of such reports is in the analysis, detail, 
                                                 
1 Recently some firms have announced that they will to expand this list of summary elements to include information 
such as the projected price volatility and the stock’s dividend outlook.  See “Merrill Lynch Announces Major 
Changes to Stock Ratings and Compensation Systems for Research Analysts.”   
2 An often-cited rationale for this avoidance is that an analyst’s salary and bonus may be linked to quantifiable 
measures such as his firm’s underwriting fees or commissions generated by his recommendations, outcomes that 
may be facilitated by the issuance of favorable reports.  In addition, analysts traditionally relied on company 
management for information and thus had a reason to maintain good relations with them.  The 2000 SEC Regulation 
FD, which requires firms to publicly disseminate all material information, presumably reduces this incentive. 
3 Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2002) report that approximately 55% of all recommendations are buys or strong 
buys, 39% are holds and only 6% are sells or strong sells. See also Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman 
(2001).  Recent announcements by Wall Street Firms to change to only three ratings codify their actual behavior.  
See “Should You Trust Wall Street’s New Ratings?”     2 
and tone.
4”   This is especially true for reiterations, which represent almost two thirds of the 
analyst reports in our database.   
Using a database constructed from analyst reports issued during 1997-1999, we examine 
if, after controlling for changes in earnings forecasts and summary recommendations, the 
market’s response to the release of a security analyst report varies with price target changes and 
other information contained in the report.  Our analysis shows that changes in the summary stock 
recommendations, earnings forecasts, and price targets all provide independent information to 
the capital markets.  In particular, incorporating changes in analyst price targets dramatically 
increases the fit of our regression results over that obtained from earnings forecast revisions and 
discrete recommendations alone.   
Adding proxies for other information in a report, such as the strength of the written 
arguments made to support an analyst’s opinion, significantly alters our results.  As expected, the 
stronger the justifications provided in the report, the larger the market’s reaction to the report.    
After including this additional information in our model, our results show that although the 
market reaction is still correlated with changes in price targets, the significance of earnings 
forecast revisions decreases.  Moreover, while our recommendation downgrades remain 
statistically negative, the significance of recommendation upgrades is eliminated.  Recent 
reductions in the recommendation levels used by some firms (e.g., from five to three by Merrill 
Lynch and Goldman Sachs) will likely further increase the market’s reaction to price targets and 
other information contained in analyst reports.
5 
We extend our analysis to examine if the market treats an analyst’s report differently 
based on the type of recommendation revision.  For example, is a change in a firm’s price target, 
earnings forecasts or an analyst’s justifications for an opinion more important in a report that 
reiterates an old recommendation or in a report that provides an upgrade or downgrade?  We find 
                                                 
4 See “When a Stock’s Rating and Target Collide.” 
5 See “Should You Trust Wall Street’s New Ratings?” 
   3 
that the contents of an analyst’s report receive the most scrutiny in the case of downgrades.  The 
changes in a firm’s price target, earnings forecasts and the strength of a report’s arguments are 
all positively correlated with the market’s response.  Also, the coefficient on our proxy for a 
relationship between a brokerage and a firm under analysis is statistically negative.  This 
suggests that the market discounts good news and amplifies bad news when the brokerage is not 
independent of the firm.  The strength of an analyst’s arguments and price target changes are also 
important in the case of reiterations.  However, the market places little weight on these examined 
factors in the case of upgrades.   
Finally, we examine the accuracy of price targets and the effects of the valuation 
methodology employed by an analyst.  We consider a price target prediction to be accurate if the 
analyzed firm’s stock price equals the projected price at any time during the 12-month period 
following the release of a report.  Using this definition of accuracy, we find that approximately 
54% of analysts’ price targets are achieved or exceeded.  The remaining 46% of firms achieve an 
average of 84% of the price target within 12 months.  The level of optimism exhibited by an 
analyst, as measured by the projected change in a firm’s stock price, appears to be inversely 
related to the probability of achieving a particular target.   
We find that the valuation methodology used by analysts is not significant in explaining 
either the market’s reaction to the analyst’s recommendations or to their accuracy in predicting 
price targets.  In fact, most analysts use a simple earnings multiple valuation model.  Only a 
minority use Net Present Value or other discounted cash flow approaches favored by finance 
textbooks and MBA curriculums. 
In Section 2 we summarize prior research.  Section 3 describes the data and sample 
selection criteria as well as a typical analyst report.  We discuss our empirical results in Section 
4.  Sections 5 and 6 provide results on price target accuracy and valuation methodologies and 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
   4 
2.  Prior Research  
  Over the past two decades, security analysts’ reports have been the subject of extensive 
empirical and experimental work. These prior investigations are primarily related to either the 
market’s reaction to earnings forecast revisions or revisions in analysts’ recommendations.  Most 
of this work shows positive (negative) abnormal returns for upward (downward) earnings 
forecast revisions or new buy (sell) recommendations.  For example, Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya 
(1982) find significant abnormal returns during the publication week of forecast revisions by 
Merrill Lynch analysts.  Similarly, Lys and Sohn (1990) present evidence consistent with 
forecast revisions having information content (see also Stickel (1991)).   
 Research examining short-window returns associated with revisions in analyst 
recommendations has also found a positive association between abnormal returns and the 
direction of a recommendation change.  Lloyd Davies and Canes (1978) indirectly examine the 
market reaction to security analyst recommendations by studying stock suggestions appearing in 
the Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column.  They find an event day return of 0.93% 
(-2.37%) for new buy (sell) recommendations.
6  More recently, Womack (1996) uses First Call 
data to directly examine price reactions for stock recommendation changes to and from the most 
extreme buy and sell categories.  He finds that stocks added to (removed from) strong buy lists 
earned size adjusted returns of 2.98% (-1.94%) while stocks added to (removed from) strong sell 
lists earned size adjusted returns of -4.69% (0.32%) in the 3-day event period surrounding the 
release of the recommendation revision.  In most of these studies, reiterations of a previous 
forecast or recommendation are ignored.  In this paper, by examining the content of an analyst 
report beyond the summary recommendation, we are able to draw conclusions about reiterations 
as well as revisions.   
Our work is also related to research investigating security returns conditional on 
examining both earnings forecast and recommendation revisions simultaneously.  For example, 
                                                 
6 See also Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1983), Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986), Liu, Smith, and Syed 
(1990), Beneish (1991), and Stickel (1995).   5 
Francis and Soffer (1997) find that neither earnings forecast revisions nor stock 
recommendations completely incorporate the information in the other signal.  They also show 
that when a report is summarized by a favorable stock recommendation, investors rely on 
earnings forecast revisions to a greater extent.  Stickel (1995), in addition to the summary 
recommendation and earnings forecast revisions, includes proxies for the magnitude of the 
recommendation revision, the analyst’s reputation, the size of the analyst’s brokerage house, and 
the analyzed firm’s information environment.  His results are consistent with those of Francis 
and Soffer indicating that earnings forecast revisions are informative even in the presence of a 
summary recommendation.  He also finds that company size and analyst reputation affect returns 
for buy recommendations, while the magnitude of the recommendation revision and brokerage 
size affect returns for sell recommendations.   
Although Francis and Soffer and Stickel’s studies include a broad cross-section of 
potential factors (other than price targets), which could contribute to the market’s reaction to a 
new recommendation, adjusted R
2
s for their models are low.  The adjusted R
2
 for Stickle’s study 
is 1% for his buy regression and 2% for his sell regression, suggesting that important pieces of 
the puzzle were missing.  Francis and Soffer get an adjusted R
2
 of 5% for their complete cross-
sectional model.  In this paper, we investigate the effects of additional report information, not 
included in earlier work, such as price targets and the strength of the arguments made. These 
additional sources of information result in adjusted R
2
s of over 24%.     
Finally, our work is related to Hirst, Koonce, and Simko (1995) who use an experimental 
setting to investigate how potential investors assess the information contained in security 
analysts’ reports conditional on the characteristics of both the analyst and the report.  They alter 
the source of the report (independent brokerage or analyzed firm’s investment bank), the report’s 
conclusions (favorable or unfavorable), and the strength of the arguments made in the report 
(strong or weak).  Based on psychology research, they predict and find that when an unfavorable 
report is issued, investors seek out other information to corroborate the unfavorable news.   6 
 In particular, Hirst, Koonce, and Simko find that when a report is unfavorable the 
strength of the arguments contained in an analyst’s report affects investors’ judgments.  This 
result conflicts with Francis and Soffer (1997) who find that investors are more likely to rely on 
other information in cases of good news reports.  Furthermore, Hirst, Koonce, and Simko report 
that experimental investors react more strongly to negative reports from analysts who lack 
independence.  The effects associated with a lack of independence are similar to those found in 
Michaely and Womack (1999), which documents that the mean excess returns around a buy 
recommendation revision are lower when the recommendation is made by an underwriter than by 
an unaffiliated brokerage.   
Two other recent papers incorporate price targets.  Bradshaw (2002) documents a 
correlation between price targets, recommendations, and earnings based measures on a sample of 
103 analyst reports.  Brav and Lehavy (2001), using a large database of price targets, find a 
significant market reaction to price targets both unconditionally and conditional on 
contemporaneous recommendation and earnings forecast revisions.  They also regress these three 
variables and find adjusted R
2
s of almost 8%.  Our paper differs in that we examine a large 
sample of actual analyst reports and our analysis provides information beyond earnings forecasts, 
recommendations, and price targets.  We demonstrate that other information, such as the strength 
of the analyst’s justifications, are also important and actually subsume some of the information 
available in earnings forecasts and recommendation revisions. 
 
3.  Sample Selection and Data Description  
3.1. Sample  selection 
Our analysis uses a total of 1,126 complete analysts’ reports written by 56 unique sell-
side analysts from 11 different investment banks covering 46 industries as provided by the 
Investext database.  Investext features current research reports from more than 630 investment 
banks, brokerage houses, and research firms worldwide including, but not limited to, Credit 
Suisse First Boston, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and   7 
Salomon Smith Barney.  Each report was read in its entirety and coded by hand for 30 separate 
data fields. 
There are a number of financial databases that catalog and summarize earnings forecasts 
and analyst recommendations (e.g., Zacks Investment Research and I/B/E/S).  To the best of our 
knowledge, however, there are currently no databases that provide similarly compiled 
information that includes analyst price targets and other information, such as valuation 
methodologies or justifications for recommendations made, typically found in an analyst report.  
The only way to collect this information is to read individual analyst reports and hand code the 
contents.  To generate our sample, we select equity analyst reports that were written in 1997, 
1998, or 1999 by a member of Institutional Investor’s All-America Research Team.
7  We chose 
these analysts because they have been independently recognized as top analysts in their given 
industries.  Furthermore, prior research finds that All-America Research Team members supply 
more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts (e.g., Stickel (1992)) and their 
recommendation revisions result in a stronger stock market reaction than that observed for a 
typical analyst (see Stickel (1995)). 
During our sample period, the number of analysts receiving top honors in the Institutional 
Investor survey each year ranged from 76 to 84.  However, since many analysts were multiple 
year winners, only 153 unique analysts are represented in our sample.  In addition to being 
written bya recent All-America Research Team member, the report must also be available 
through both the Zacks Investment Research (Zacks) and Investext Databases.  When we began 
our initial analysis, Investext did not allow users to search reports by analyst.  As a result, we 
used Zacks to generate a list of reports written by our sample of analysts.
8  Zacks identified 
approximately 7,100 reports that met our year and analyst criteria.  These analyst reports 
                                                 
7 To qualify for inclusion in the sample, an analyst must have achieved at least one “First Team” ranking during 
1996-1999. 
8 Investext has since released a newer version that provides more search alternatives including a category for report 
author.   8 
consisted of both company and industry reports.
9  All of these analyst reports were then cross-
referenced in the Investext database using company and brokerage identifiers as well as report 
dates obtained from Zacks. 
In our matching, 21 analysts could not be included in our sample because the investment 
firms that employ them do not provide reports to Investext (e.g., Goldman Sachs).  We realize 
that this introduces a potential bias into our sample, as only firms willing to make their reports 
publicly available are included within our sample.  Moreover, five of the 99 industries for which 
Institutional Investor issues a ranking, Accounting and Tax Policy, Convertibles, Equity 
Derivatives, Multi-Industry, and Quantitative Research, do not require that analysts follow any 
specifically identified firms.  We excluded these categories, which represented seven additional 
analysts, from our sample.  In total, we omit 28 analysts from our All-America Research Team 
sample, leaving 125 unique analysts.  
Unfortunately, the Investext database is less complete than Zacks and we were only able 
to find a subset of the Zacks reports.
10  More specifically, Investext contains fewer analysts and 
does not contain as many reports by the analysts it does list.  Of the analyst reports listed in 
Zacks, the percentages found in Investext were less than 13.1%, 12.4%, and 50.3% in 1997, 98, 
and 99 respectively.  Our final sample includes 1,126 reports consisting of 262 upgrades, 739 
reiterations, and 125 downgrades, written by 56 analysts. 
Having identified our sample, the primary challenge remaining was determining the 
correct announcement date for each report.  Firms often release key information contained in the 
analyst report before the actual report is dated and made available.  As a consequence, the 
announcement dates given by many analyst databases, including Zacks, often differ from the 
                                                 
9 We omit Industry reports from our sample. We find that these reports did not usually contain new company 
specific information but rather served as a summary across several firms.  Furthermore, if an analyst reported new 
information about a company and/or changed his recommendations in an industry report, he usually issued a 
concurrent separate company report as well.   
10 Zacks also appears to be incomplete.  Investext contains some reports by particular analysts that were not 
identified in our search of Zacks.  In both Investext and Zacks, coverage significantly improves in the latter part of 
our sample period.   9 
date given on the report.
11  Obtaining the correct date is clearly important, given that our analysis 
involves examining the market reaction to information releases from the reports.  We explored 
various sources of news releases including Dow Jones and Lexis-Nexus, as well as finance 
websites such as Yahoo, to determine the correct information announcement date for a random 
sample of 50 reports.  We found that Zacks was particularly accurate in reporting 
recommendation release dates and thus we used its dates as our announcement dates whenever 
possible. 
 
3.2.  Typical analyst report 
Table 1, Panels A and B, presents summary statistics on average values and frequency of 
reporting for several of the data fields that we collect from each analyst report.  All reports 
contain a summary stock recommendation and our table is organized by recommendation 
category, such as upgrade to strong buy or downgrade to hold, as well as by the combined 
categories all upgrades, all reiterations, or all downgrades, and a total sample column.
12  The 
majority of the reports also include summary earnings forecasts and price targets.  Additional 
data included in each report in support of the authoring analyst’s forecasts and opinions are 
presented in Table 1.  These include the prevalence of accounting statement forecasts and 
segment data analyses, data regarding relationships between the analyst’s brokerage and the firm, 
data regarding the valuation methods employed, and the analyst’s qualitative justifications of his 
or her recommendation.   
Consistent with other studies and recent press reports, we find that analysts rarely issue 
sell or strong sell recommendations.  Line 2 of Table 1, Panel A, shows that only 0.5% of the 
recommendations in our sample fall into these two categories.  In contrast, 30.8% of the 
                                                 
11 In our sample 58.6% of all report dates matched the announcement date exactly, leaving 41.4% of the analyst 
reports dated differently from the Zacks dates.  Of the reports where dates differed, 92% of the time the report date 
fell after the corresponding Zacks date. 
12 An analyst’s report generally indicates whether its recommendation is an upgrade, downgrade or reiteration.  In 
cases where the previous recommendation is indeterminate, we use the previous recommendation as conveyed by 
Zacks to classify the report.   10 
recommendations are classified as strong buy, 40.0% as buy, and 28.7% as hold.  We also find 
that the majority of reports issued across all recommendations are reiterations.  The last three 
columns before the Total column in Table 1, Panel A, show that upgrades, downgrades, and 
reiterations represent 23.3%, 11.1%, and 65.6% of our sample, respectively.   
One hundred percent of our reports contain a summary stock recommendation and almost 
all reports also provide EPS forecasts; 99.1% for the current fiscal year and 95.3% for at least 
one subsequent year.  There is no notable difference in the percentage of reports that contain 
one-year earnings forecasts across recommendation types.  At 89.6%, the downgrade to hold 
recommendations are the only category of subsequent year forecasts to fall below 90%.  
Price targets, which are the analyst’s price forecasts, are only present in 72.6% of 
analysts’ reports.  They are given as either a point estimate or a range that the stock price is 
expected to achieve within the next 12 months.  Price targets, while not as common as 
recommendations or earnings forecasts in the total sample, are even less frequent for unfavorable 
reports.  In our sample, while over 90% of all strong buy or buy recommendations include price 
targets, only 11.1% of hold reiterations and 50.6% of hold downgrades include these projections.  
Overall, 95.8% of upgrades, 65.5% of reiterations, and 65.6% of downgrades include price 
forecasts.  It appears that analysts’ reluctance to issue negative information via downgrades 
extends to price targets as well, although not as strongly.  In fact, 62.8% of downgrades that do 
not include a price target in the current report had one in the prior report.  In light of recent 
events, some investment banks are specifically requiring their analyst to disclose price targets in 
reports with a positive recommendation (e.g., Merrill Lynch).  In addition, these banks are 
including a stock chart indicating the points at which they changed their recommendations or 
price targets.
13   
The projected stock price increase, i.e. the percentage the price target is above the current 
price, varies systematically across recommendation categories.  For example the third line under 
                                                 
13 See “ Merrill Lynch Announces Major Changes to Stock Ratings and Compensation Systems for Research 
Analysts.”   11 
the category Price Targets in Table 1, Panel A, shows that the average projected increase over 
the current stock price for an upgrade to strong buy or buy are 34.6% and 22.6%, respectively.  
Interestingly, reiterations have even higher stock price increases than upgrades for each 
recommendation category.  For the entire sample, reiterations project an average 36.6% increase 
while upgrades project a 28.9% average increase.  Price targets below current market price are 
fairly uncommon.  Even in unfavorable reports such as a downgrade to hold, the average 
projected increase is a positive 5.5%.   
In addition to price targets and earnings forecasts, we compile information on income 
statements, balance sheets, statements of cash flow, and segment forecasts.  Based on our 
sample, financial statement forecasts are not disclosed as frequently as earnings or price 
forecasts.  Of the reports in our sample, 28.5% contain income statement forecasts, 5.1% contain 
balance sheet forecasts, and 17.1% contain statement of cash flow forecasts.  Although the 
percentages of upgrade and downgrade reports that contain financial statement forecasts are 
similar (46.6% and 40.0%, respectively), these percentages are much higher than those of 
reiterated reports, which contain these forecasts only 20.1% of the time.  Very few analyst 
reports contain geographic (3.6%), product (4.2%), or segment information (10.0%). 
We also collect information on existing relationships between the company and the 
investment bank writing the report.  Analysts are required to provide this information in their 
report.  Of the firms examined, 52.5% have an underwriting relationship with the analyst’s 
brokerage.  The underwriting relationship is similar across both upgrades and reiterations at 
53%.  Downgrades are only slightly less frequent with an underwriting relationship in 46.4% of 
the cases examined.  Differences in current holdings are more varied.  Investment banks have 
holdings in 84.2% of the firms analyzed.  Holdings of company stock exist in 68.3%, 63.2% and 
93.4% of upgrades, downgrades and reiterations, respectively.   
Next, we document the valuation methods used by the analysts in Table 1, Panel A, under 
the category Valuation Models.  We find that 99.1% of analysts mention they use some sort of 
earnings multiple (e.g., a price to earnings ratio, a price to EBIT multiple, or a relative price to   12 
earnings ratio).  Only 12.8% of analysts report using any variation of discounted cash flow in 
computing their price targets.  Notably, the discounted cash flow method is much more prevalent 
in downgraded reports, 20.8% compared to 13.7% and 11.1% in upgrades and reiterations, 
respectively.  Valuation models based on asset multiples are used in 25.1% of all reports and 
22.9%, 27.6% and 15.2% of upgrades, reiterations and downgrades, respectively.  Very few 
analysts use alternative valuation methodologies.  Other valuation methods not falling into one of 
the three categories discussed above are observed in less than 3.6% of our sample.  All analysts 
who mention a valuation method use an earnings multiple.  That is, the 0.9% that do not mention 
an earnings multiple do not mention any valuation method. 
Finally, Table 1, Panel B, catalogs the analyst’s qualitative justifications of his or her 
recommendation.  Positive and negative remarks are recorded for sixteen specific criteria: value, 
relative value, sales growth, earnings growth, new product introductions, new projects, cost 
efficiencies, expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, industry climate, 
management, international operations, leverage, competition, and risk.  Only 3% of our sample 
(34 reports) do not contain some justification of the recommendations. 
 
3.3. Model  variables 
Our empirical analyses require us to calculate several variables not directly provided in 
the analyst reports we examine (see Table 1, Panel C).  The first model variable we compute is 
the percentage change in an analyst’s earnings forecast for a firm (EARN_REV).  This is the 
new earnings forecast divided by the old earnings forecast minus 1.  Since the current report does 
not usually contain the previous earnings forecast, we collect previous earnings forecasts from 
Investext, from the report immediately preceding the one in our sample.  We obtain previous 
earnings forecasts for 1,029 reports, 91.4% of our sample.
14  We find an average earnings 
                                                 
14 We cannot be certain that the earnings forecast we obtained is from the report immediately prior to our sample 
report due to reports missing on Investext, however errors from obtaining earlier forecasts should weaken our 
results.  This is discussed further in the results section.   13 
forecast change of 4.1% and 4.0% for strong buy and buy upgrades, respectively.  In contrast, 
unfavorable reports such as a downgrade to buy or hold generally experience reductions in 
forecasted earnings.  Downgrades to buy result in an average reduction in earnings forecasts of 
7.3%, while downgrades to hold experience a reduction of 4.5%.  Overall, upgrades, 
downgrades, and reiterations experience earnings forecast changes of 4.1%, -2.1%, and -3.6% 
respectively. 
The second model variable we compute is the percentage change in an analyst’s price 
target forecast for a firm (TGT_REV).  This is the new price target divided by the old price 
target minus 1.  Since the current report rarely contains the previous price target, we collect 
previous price target information, as available from Investext as described above.  We obtain 
previous price targets for 664 reports or 59.0% of our sample.
15  We find an average price target 
change of 2.8% for the total sample.  The average price target changes are 13.8% and 5.5% for 
strong buy and buy upgrades, respectively.  In contrast, we find price target changes of only 
1.0% and 2.7% for strong buy and buy reiterations.  Downgrades to buy result in an average 
reduction in price targets of 7.0%, while downgrades to hold experience an average reduction of 
7.5%.  Overall, upgrades, downgrades, and reiterations experience average price target changes 
of 11.4%, -7.3%, and 1.9%, respectively.  Except for downgrades to hold and strong sell, the 
average price target revisions are more positive than average earnings forecast revisions.  
Earnings forecast revisions and price target changes are the only model variables not computed 
for every report in our sample.   
To measure the relationship between the firm analyzed and the analyst’s employer, we 
construct another model variable, a proxy for underwriter affiliation (UND_HLD).  This 
indicator variable takes on a value of 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s brokerage and the 
firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in the firm, 
                                                 
15 We cannot be certain that the price target we obtained is from the report immediately prior to our sample report 
due to reports missing on Investext, however errors from obtaining earlier targets should weaken our results.  This is 
discussed further in the results section.   14 
and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has current holdings.  The average UND_HLD 
is similar for upgrades and downgrades with a value of 1.2 and 1.1, respectively.  Reiterations 
are slightly higher with an average value of 1.5. 
We model the analyst’s qualitative justifications for his or her opinion by constructing a 
“strength of arguments” variable (STR_ARG).  This variable is computed by aggregating the 
number of positive remarks less the number of negative remarks from Table 1, Panel B.  In 
general, upgrades have an average strength value of 4.8 compared to 2.1 for reiterations and -0.3 
for downgrades.  It is notable that downgrades still result in an average score close to zero.  This 
is consistent with the desire to minimize management retaliation since company management is a 
key source of information and future underwriting business. 
Next, we measure the market’s reaction to the release of analyst reports with CAR, our 
fifth model variable.  CAR is the five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal return centered 
on the report release date.  The average mean CAR for all firms in our sample is a negligible 
0.5%.  Consistent with our expectations and prior research, we find a statistically positive 
average mean return of 4.5% for upgrades, a statistically significant mean return of -6.6% for 
downgrades and an insignificant mean reaction of 0.3% for reiterations.  Breaking up report 
types into specific summary categories yields similar results.  Upgrades to strong buy and buy 
result in significant mean returns of 4.7% and 4.1%, respectively.  Downgrades to buy and hold 
result in significant negative mean returns of -7.0% and -6.4%, on average.  The mean CARs for 
upgrades and downgrades are all statistically different from zero with a two-tailed probability 
less than 0.01.  Reiterations are generally small and insignificant with one exception:  reiterations 
of hold recommendations have an average mean return of -1.1%.  Reports representing hold 
upgrades, sell and strong sell downgrades or reiterations have too few observations to draw any 
reliable conclusions as to average market reactions.
16   
                                                 
16 We find that a particular report’s direction (e.g., upgrade, downgrade, or reiteration) tends to dominate the specific 
recommendation level. The differences in the observed market reaction between strong buy upgrades and buy 
upgrades, buy downgrades and hold downgrades, or strong buy reiterations versus buy reiterations are all 
insignificant.  As such, although we provide descriptive statistics for reports categorized by both report type and 
summary recommendation, our primary empirical tests are performed on reports categorized by direction only.   15 
4. Empirical  results 
4.1.  Earnings, recommendations, and price target revisions 
We first replicate prior research on our sample and document that the market reacts to 
earnings forecast and recommendation revisions contained in a security analyst report at the time 
of its release.  Market reaction is measured by five-day market adjusted returns centered on the 
report’s release date.  This allows for possible delays by a brokerage in delivering its forecasts to 
Zacks or for leaks of the information prior to its public release.  We then investigate whether this 
reaction is affected by revisions in a firm’s price target.  Later in this section we also investigate 
whether the strength of the arguments used in the report or the presence of an underwriting 
relationship or current holdings affect the market’s reaction.   
Table 2 estimates the following regression using ordinary least squares:   
CARj,t = α 0 + α 1EARN_REVj,t + α 2UP_GRj,t + α 3DOWN_GRj,t + α 4TGT_REVj,t 
                           + α 5 STR_ARGj,t + α 6 UND_HLDj,t  + ε j,t   (1) 
 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
 
CARj,t =   five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal return for firm j centered on 




Percentage change in the analyst’s earnings forecast for firm j at time t 
computed as [(earnings forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time t-1) – 1];  
 
UP_GRj,t =   a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that 
indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been upgraded, 0 otherwise; 
 
DOWN_GRj,t =   a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that 
indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been downgraded, 0 otherwise; 
 
TGT_REVj,t =   Percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at time t 
computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t-1) – 1];  
 
STR_ARGj,t =   a variable computed by aggregating the number of positive remarks less the 
number of negative remarks related to 16 specific criteria: value, relative 
value, sales growth, earnings growth, new product introductions, new 
projects, cost efficiencies, expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, 
repurchase programs, industry climate, management, international operations, 
leverage, competition, and risk;   16 
 
UND_HLDj,t =   a variable taking on the value 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s 
brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of the firm 
or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an 
underwriter and has current holdings; 
 
ε j,t =   assumed normally distributed error term with zero mean and constant 
variance. 
 
  This regression is estimated using EARN_REVj,t and TGT_REVj,t from prior reports 
released within 60 days of our report.  As described above, we collect prior earnings and price 
targets from the same analyst’s Investext report immediately preceding ours.  Since Investext is 
not complete, i.e. it does not contain all reports, there is a chance that another report was released 
after the prior report we collect.  If so this will make our regression results weaker.  Since an 
analyst usually writes a minimum of six reports a year on the companies they follow, we do not 
include revisions from prior reports issued more than 60 days before our report.  This restriction 
minimizes the effect of missing reports.
17   
  Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 2 present the results from estimating regressions for 
earnings forecast revisions, recommendation revisions, and changes in price targets individually 
(i.e., only including those proxy variables in the OLS regressions).  If, as documented in prior 
research, the market reacts to changes in earnings forecasts and the recommendation contained in 
the typical security analyst report, the coefficients EARN_REV in column 1 and UP_GR in 
column 2 will be positive while DOWN_GR in column 2 will be negative.  If as predicted, 
analyst price target revisions have information, TGT_REV in column 3 will be positive.   
  Consistent with prior research, we find that the coefficient on EARN_REV is positive 
and statistically significant, (0.0545, t = 2.81, one-tailed p < 0.01), suggesting that increases 
(decreases) in earnings forecasts are associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns.  Also 
in agreement with existing work, we find that reiterations, upgrades, and downgrades are 
                                                 
17 Using longer time periods, e.g. 60 to 90 days or all reports over 90 days, reduces the significance levels of the 
variables EARN_REV and TGT_REV.    17 
associated with insignificant, positive, and negative abnormal returns, respectively.  The 
intercept in column 2 is the mean abnormal return associated with a reiteration (-0.0044, t = -
1.12, two-tailed p > 0.10).  Column 2A calculates the mean returns associated with an upgrade 
(0.0473, F = 44.84, one-tailed p < 0.01) or downgrade (-0.0894, F = 66.77, one-tailed p < 0.01) 
by summing (α 0 + α 2) and (α 0 + α 3), respectively. 
  The results for price target revisions are reported in column 3.  As predicted, TGT_REV 
is positive and statistically significant consistent with an association between positive (negative) 
abnormal returns and increasing (decreasing) price targets (0.3191, t = 9.34, one-tailed p < 0.01).  
This shows that price target revisions contain new information that is quickly impounded by the 
market.  In fact, the market reaction for a given change in a price target forecast is stronger than 
that for an equal percentage change in an earnings forecast, i.e. higher coefficient, t value, and a 
higher adjusted R
2.   
  In column 4, we examine whether each of the three summary components of an analyst 
report, forecast revisions, recommendations, and price target changes, contribute information 
beyond what’s contained in the others.  When all three are included in our regression, we find 
that earnings forecast revisions, price target revisions, and the mean return for an upgrade remain 
positive and statistically significant while the mean return for a downgrade remains statistically 
negative.  The results for price target revisions remain stronger than those of earnings forecast 
revisions.  Including the three primary components of an analyst’s report simultaneously in our 
regression increases the adjusted R
2 to 22%.  Our results extend Francis and Soffer (1997), who 
only look at earnings forecast revisions and recommendations, and support the conjecture that 
the information in each of the three components of an analyst’s report is not subsumed by the 
other two.  Column 4A calculates, as column 2A did, the mean returns and F values for upgrades 
and downgrades by summing (α 0 + α 2) and (α 0 + α 3). 
  Regression results reported in column 5 examine the effects of the strength of an 
analyst’s arguments and affiliations between the brokerage and the analyzed firm by adding 
STR_ARG and UND_HLD.  We predict that the strength of arguments contained in the report is   18 
likely to amplify investor’s reactions to both good and bad news suggesting that α 5 will be 
positive.  In cases where a brokerage may have served as an underwriter for or has current 
holdings in a reviewed firm, we expect investors to exhibit skepticism in responding to good 
news and a more pronounced reaction to bad news resulting in α 6 being negative.  The 
coefficient on STR_ARG is positive and statistically significant (0.0080, t = 3.59, one-tailed p < 
0.01) indicating that investors react to a report’s contents even in the presence of the three 
primary components previously discussed.  However, earnings forecast revisions are now less 
significant (0.0666, t = 1.89, one-tailed p < 0.05) and recommendation upgrades are no longer 
significant.   Given information regarding the strength of an analyst’s arguments as contained in 
a report’s text and affiliation, investors appear to no longer rely on upgrade labels attached to a 
report and rely less on earnings forecast revisions.  In contrast, downgrades remain significant 
and provide information in addition to the strength of arguments.  Finally, we find that the 
coefficient for existing relationships between the analyst and company is statistically 
insignificant contradicting prior work (-0.0017, t = -0.25, one-tailed p > 0.10).   
  Overall, our results in Table 2 replicate the findings of prior research that earnings forecast 
revisions and recommendation changes are positively and significantly associated with the 
market’s reaction at the time a security analyst report is released.  More importantly, our results 
provide support for the hypothesis that price target changes contain information even in the 
presence of the other key components of an analyst report.  This information is significant and is 
stronger than that contained in earnings forecast revisions.  Finally, we demonstrate the importance 
of including the strength of arguments presented by an analyst in support of his recommendations. 
 
4.2.  The effects of report type 
Prior research, the CARs in Table 1, Panel C, and column 2 of Table 2 indicate that the 
market reacts as predicted to changes in recommendations, i.e. positively to upgrades and 
negatively to downgrades.  This holds even when other key summary elements, i.e. earnings 
forecast revisions and price target revisions are added.  However, column 5 indicates that   19 
additional information, such as strength of arguments, affects upgrades differently from 
downgrades.  In this section, we further investigate the effects of the information released in an 
analyst report by conditioning on the direction of the recommendation revision.   
Current evidence on whether or not investors tend to place greater reliance on specific 
information in an analyst’s report conditional on report type (e.g., upgrade, downgrade, or 
reiteration) is inconclusive.  As stated earlier, Francis and Soffer (1997) find that investors place 
greater weight on earnings forecast revisions for favorable reports while Hirst, Koonce, and 
Simko (1995) find that investors are more likely to analyze other information when reports are 
unfavorable.  Our database allows us to examine this question utilizing a broader set of 
information than that available to Francis and Soffer and overcomes the shortcomings associated 
with an experimental setting such as the one employed by Hirst, Koonce, and Simko.  To 
investigate whether potential investors assess the information contained in security analysts’ 
reports conditional on whether the report is an upgrade, a reiteration, or a downgrade, we 
estimate the following regression using ordinary least squares:   
 CARj,t = γ 0 + γ 1EARN_REVj,t + γ 2UP_GRj,t + γ 3DOWN_GRj,t + γ 4TGT_REVj,t 
                            + γ 5 STR_ARGj,t + γ 6 UND_HLDj,t + γ 7EARN_REVj,t * UP_GRj,t  
                            + γ 8EARN_REVj,t * DOWN_GRj,t  + γ 9TGT_REVj,t * UP_GRj,t  
                            + γ 10TGT_REVj,t * DOWN_GRj,t    + γ 11STR_ARGj,t * UP_GRj,t  
                            + γ 12STR_ARGj,t * DOWN_GRj,t    + γ 13UND_HLDj,t * UP_GRj,t  
                            + γ 14UND_HLDj,t * DOWN_GRj,t  + ξ j,t (2) 
Equation (2) is simply equation (1) modified by the addition of eight interaction variables 
computed as EARN_REV*UP_GR, EARN_REV*DOWN_GR, TGT_REV*UP_GR, 
TGT_REV*DOWN_GR, STR_ARG*UP_GR, STR_ARG*DOWN_GR, UND_HLD*UP_GR, 
and UND_HLD*DOWN_GR.   
The intercept, γ 0, represents an investor’s reaction to a reiteration of a prior 
recommendation, controlling for all the other information found in the analyst’s report.  
Likewise, the coefficient values on EARN_REV (γ 1), TGT_REV (γ 4), STR_ARG (γ 5), and   20 
UND_HLD (γ 6) represent the degree an investor reacts to earnings forecast revisions, target 
revisions, the strength of a report’s arguments, and the affiliation of the brokerage issuing the 
recommendation for a reiteration.   
Tests of hypotheses about how a report’s type affects investor reaction are based on the 
upgrade (UP_GR) and downgrade (DOWN_GR) shift and differential variables.  For example, a 
significant negative coefficient on TGT_REV*UP_GR would indicate that investors place less 
weight on target revisions for upgrades as related to reiterations.  The mean coefficients and F 
statistics for upgrades as they relate to earnings forecast revisions, target revisions, the strength 
of a report’s arguments and the affiliation characteristics of the brokerage issuing the 
recommendation are captured by (γ 1 + γ 7, EARN_REV + EARN_REV * UP_GR), (γ 4 + γ 9, 
TGT_REV + TGT_REV * UP_GR), (γ 5 + γ 11, STR_ARG + STR_ARG * UP_GR), and (γ 6 + γ 13, 
UND_HLD + UND_HLD * UP_GR).  Similarly the mean coefficients and F statistics for 
downgrades are given by (γ 1+ γ 8, EARN_REV + EARN_REV * DOWN_GR), (γ 4 + γ 10, 
TGT_REV + TGT_REV * DOWN_GR), (γ 5 + γ 12, STR_ARG + STR_ARG * DOWN_GR), and 
(γ 6 + γ 14, UND_HLD + UND_HLD * DOWN_GR).  
  Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (2) organized by recommendation 
revision type.  We find evidence that investors assess the information contained in security 
analysts’ reports conditional on whether the report is an upgrade, a reiteration, or a downgrade.  
Investors appear most interested in an analyst’s supporting documentation and affiliation in the 
case of a downgrade.  As expected, TGT_REV (γ 4 + γ 10 = 0.3841, F = 13.09, one-tailed p < 
0.01), EARN_REV (γ 5 + γ 8 = 0.1659, F = 2.74, one-tailed p < 0.05) and STR_ARG (γ 3 + γ 12 = 
0.0149, F = 3.21, one-tailed p < 0.05) are all significantly positive while HLD_UND is 
significantly negative (γ 6 + γ 14 = -0.0251, F = 1.92, one-tailed p < 0.10).  In the case of 
reiterations, only price targets revisions (0.1889, t = 4.27, one-tailed p<0.01) and the strength of 
the arguments (0.0102, t = 4.16, one-tailed p < 0.01) are statistically significant.  Unlike 
downgrades, however, in reiterations investors do not appear to adjust their reaction in response   21 
to earnings forecast revisions (0.0309, t = 0.81, one-tailed p > 0.10) or to an affiliation to the 
analyst’s brokerage and the firm being analyzed (0.0003, t = 0.03, one-tailed p > 0.10).     
  In contrast to the results observed for downgrades and reiterations, but consistent with 
Hirst, Koonce, and Simko (1995), investors do not appear to investigate beyond report type in 
the case of upgrades.  The mean return for upgrades is large, positive, and statistically significant 
(γ 0 + γ 2 = 0.0936, F = 7.63, one-tailed p < 0.01).  However, the coefficient estimates for 
EARN_REV (γ 1 + γ 7 = 0.1132, F = 0.59, one-tailed p > 0.10), TGT_REV (γ 4 + γ 9 = 0.0606, F = 
0.48, one-tailed p > 0.10), and UND_HLD (γ 6 + γ 13 = 0.0053, F = 0.14, one-tailed p > 0.10) are 
all insignificant.  The only anomaly of our results is that the mean return for STR_ARG upgrades 
is significantly negative (γ 5 + γ 11 = -0.0117, F = 3.83, one-tailed p < 0.05) which is the opposite 
of our predicted sign. 
  These results lead to the conclusion that investors pay closer attention to the total content 
of analyst reports in the case of downgrades and reiterations.  This is not surprising in the case of 
reiterations since the recommendation level does not contain much new information.  However, 
investors seem to read downgrade reports closely, utilizing more supporting information than in 
the case of upgrades.  Even though other information contained in an analyst’s report beyond the 
summary recommendation is not significant in the case of recommendation upgrades, the 
contents of a report are still important for reiterations and downgrades.  As shown in Table 1, 
these two categories constitute 76.6% of all reports issued during our sample period. 
 
5.  Price Target Accuracy  
  Price targets received most of the analyst media coverage prior to the recent emphasis on 
recommendation levels.  Headlines such as “Price Targets are Hazardous to Investors’ Wealth” 
or “Forget Analysts’ Price Targets. They’re Really Just for Show” represent the content of these 
articles.
18  Skepticism about analysts’ research and the projections they produce has also 
                                                 
18 See Morgenson (2001) and Maiello (2000).   22 
captured the attention of members of congress and the SEC (See Tully (2001)).  As discussed 
earlier, analysts may be more likely to issue highly favorable recommendations due to concerns 
over personal compensation, relationships with the analyzed firms’ management, or their own 
firm’s underwriting business.  Price targets may either be a way for analysts to ameliorate the 
effects of overly optimistic reports, or a part of the sales hype used to peddle stocks.  In sections 
4.1 and 4.2, we provide evidence consistent with price target changes containing important 
additional information used by investors.  This result is especially true for reiterations and 
downgrades.  This is proof that the market does react to price targets, the question now becomes 
should they?  In this section, we provide some results on price target accuracy.    
Our analysis uses 818 price targets issued between 1997 and 1999.  Of this sample, 796 
forecasts are for a price target above the current price.  For this subsample, we consider a price 
target prediction to be accurate if the analyzed firm’s stock price equals or exceeds the projected 
price at any time during the 12-month period following the release of a report.  Most, but not all 
analysts, list a twelve-month time horizon for their price targets.  For the remaining 22 targets 
that forecast price decreases, we consider an analyst to be accurate and the target achieved if the 
stock price falls below the price target.  Table 4, Panel A, presents price target accuracy and the 
time necessary to achieve it categorized by the type of recommendation.  For the overall sample, 
we find that price forecasts are achieved in 54.28% of all cases.  Interestingly, price targets 
below the current price are achieved in 20 of the 22 instances. 
Table 4, Panel B, Column 1, Target Missed, presents the average percentage of the price 
target achieved by the 45.5% of the firms that do not reach the analysts’ price target.  The ratio is 
the maximum price achieved within 12 months divided by the price target if the price target is set 
above the current price, and the price target divided by the minimum price achieved within 12 
months if the price target is set below the current price.  Column 3, Target Achieved, shows that 
firms that achieve the price target usually overshoot it by an average of 37% during the 12 
months.  We do not consider subsequent price target revisions that may reduce this overshooting 
percentage.       23 
Although not shown, the probability of achieving a particular target is highly dependent 
on the level of optimism exhibited by the analyst.  Price targets that project a change of zero to 
ten percent and ten to twenty percent are achieved 74.42% and 59.57% of the time, respectively.  
In contrast, price targets that project a change in price of 70% or more are realized in less than 
25% of the cases observed. 
Taken together, Tables 4A and 4B show that slightly more than 50% of the price targets 
are achieved.  In instances where price forecasts are missed, the average maximum (minimum) 
price observed for projected increases (decreases) was 84% of the price target.  Whether this is a 
good record of accuracy in a rising market is a conclusion we leave to the reader.   
 
6.  Valuation methodology  
The methodology used in valuing stocks falls into one of three major categories; earnings 
or cash flow multiples, discounted cash flow (DCF) models, and asset multiples.  Earnings or 
cash flow multiples include price to earnings (PE) ratios, relative price to earnings (Relative PE) 
ratios, earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) multiples, and earnings before interest, tax, 
deprecation, and amortization (EBITDA) multiples.  DCF models use estimated discount rates 
and projected cash flows, and include free cash flow to the firm, free cash flow to equity, 
adjusted present value (APV), and enterprise value added (EVA).  Asset multiples include book 
value, market to book value, replacement value, and liquidation value. 
The first question we ask in this section is does the market react differently depending on 
the valuation methodology employed?  We add valuation dummies to equation (1) and find that 
these valuation methodologies are insignificant in all our regressions
19.  That is, the market does 
not react differently depending on the valuation methodology used by the analyst or whether the 
analyst uses one or many.  As business school professors who teach DCF as the superior 
                                                 
19 We do no report these results but they are available from the authors.   24 
valuation method, we find this result disappointing.  The methodology is either being misapplied 
or it is not significant
20.   
Next, in Table 5, we examine whether the valuation methodology employed by an analyst 
affects the probability of achieving a particular target.  Earnings multiples are not listed as a 
separate category since every report that lists valuation methodology, over 99% of analyst 
reports, use some form of PE, relative PE, or other earnings multiple.  Surprisingly, we find few 
consistencies across recommendation types.  Earnings multiples have the highest percentage of 
target achieved for reiterations, asset multiples the highest for upgrades, and DCF variations the 
highest for downgrades.  (“Other” has 100% target achieved for downgrades but there are only 
four observations.)  For all price targets the earnings multiple percentage is slightly ahead of 
DCF variations with asset multiples third.  The only consistent performance appears to come in 
cases where the analyst employs a “unique” method other than an earnings multiple, a 
discounted cash flow model, or an asset multiple.  This is usually the analyst’s own methodology 
which is not used by other analysts or covered in most valuation textbooks.  In these alternative 
model cases, the probability of achieving a projected target is significantly lower.  
 
7. Conclusion   
  This paper examines the association between security returns around the release of 
analysts’ stock reports and the content of those reports.  Using a database constructed from 
security analyst reports issued between 1997 and 1999, we replicate the findings in prior research 
that earnings forecast revisions and recommendation revisions are significantly and positively 
associated with the market’s reaction at the time a security analyst report is released.  We extend 
the literature by providing evidence that price target changes also contain information even in the 
presence of these other key components.   
                                                 
20 It is possible that a number of analysts use a DCF model to predict prices but translate this into earnings multiples 
for the text of their report.   25 
We find that the market reaction to price target revisions is stronger than that of an equal 
percentage change in earnings forecasts.  We also demonstrate that the information associated 
with changes in earnings forecasts appears to be subsumed when proxies for the strength of an 
analyst’s arguments and the affiliation between the brokerage and the firm being analyzed are 
incorporated.  
  Next, we examine whether investors assess the information contained in security 
analysts’ reports conditional on whether the report is an upgrade, a reiteration, or a downgrade.  
We find that investors place greater reliance on the content of security analyst reports when they 
are reiterations or downgrades.  In these instances, the strength of an analyst’s arguments or the 
price target revision account for a significant proportion of the observed market reaction. 
    Finally, we provide an examination of the accuracy of price targets and the importance of 
valuation methodology.  We find that approximately 54% of analysts’ price targets are achieved 
within 12 months.  When the target is missed, the average maximum (minimum) price observed 
for projected increases (decreases) was 84% of the price target.  We fail to observe any 
systematic association between the valuation method employed by an analyst and either the 
market’s reaction or the probability of achieving a price target.26 
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TABLE 1: Panel A 
 
Security Analyst Report Descriptive Statistics  
Percentages of Reports Containing Selected Data Organized by Type of Recommendation 
 
  Strong Buy  Buy  Hold  Sell  S_Sell  All  Total 
  Up Reit Up Reit  Down  Up Reit  Down  Reit  Down  Down  Up Reit  Down  Sample 
                 
Number of Reports   149 198 111 296  43  2  244  77  1  3  2  262 739 125  1126 
%  of  Sample  13.2  17.6 9.9 26.3 3.8  0.2 21.7 6.8  0.0  0.3  0.2 23.3  65.5  11.1  100.0 
                 
Earnings Forecast                 
1  Year  97.3 100.0 99.1  99.0  97.7 100.0 99.6  98.7 100.0  100.0  100.0 98.1  99.5  98.4  99.1 
Multiple  Years  95.3  96.5  95.5  95.6  93.0 100.0 95.9  89.6 100.0  100.0  100.0 95.4  95.9  91.2  95.3 
                 
Price Targets                  
Target  Reported  94.0  94.4  98.2  91.2  95.3 100.0 11.1  50.6 100.0  0.0  100.0 95.8  65.5  65.6  72.6 
Point  Estimate  Provided 88.6 95.7 90.7 97.4 80.5  100.0  96.3 92.3  100.0 NA 50.0 89.2 96.9 85.4 93.8 
Projected  Increase  34.6 44.0 22.6 34.3 21.0 -17.5 8.6  5.5  -9.6  NA -19.0 28.9 36.6 19.1 32.9 
                 
Forecasts                 
Income  Statement  55.6 24.7 35.1 13.5 39.5  0.0  24.6 39.0  0.0  33.3  100.0  46.6 20.1 40.0 28.5 
Balance  Sheet  12.1  3.5 9.0 2.7 2.3 0.0 2.0  10.3  0.0  33.3  0.0  10.7  2.7 8.0 5.1 
Cash  flow  Statement  30.9  14.6  27.9 9.8 20.9 0.0  8.6 33.8 0.0  0.0  100.0  29.4  10.7  29.6  17.1 
                 
Segment Data                 
Geographic  4.7 3.5 3.6 6.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 3.8 1.6 3.6 
Product  4.0 2.0 6.6 4.7 4.7 0.0 4.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 
Division  9.4 13.6  12.6 9.5 14.0 0.0  7.8  6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0 10.7  10.0 8.8 10.0 
                 
Affiliation                  
Underwriter  60.8 64.6 44.1 53.7 60.5  0.0  43.4 39.0  100.0  66.7  0.0  53.3 53.4 46.4 52.6 
Holdings  63.5 88.4 74.8 91.9 81.4 50.0 99.6 51.9  0.0  66.7  100.0  68.2 93.4 63.2 84.2 
                 
Valuation Models                 
Earnings  Multiples  99.3 99.5 99.1 98.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 0.0 100.0  100.0  99.2 98.9  100.0  99.1 
DCF  Variations  16.8  13.1 9.9  9.5 14.0 0.0 11.5  26.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 13.7  11.1  20.8  12.8 
Asset  Multiples  23.5 22.7 22.5 26.3 14.0  0.0  32.8 14.3  0.0  33.3 50.0 22.9 27.6 15.2 25.1 
Other  3.4 6.6 2.7 3.7 2.3 0.0 1.2 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 3.6 4.0 3.5 
                 
Average Number Pages  9.5 5.7 9.0 5.3 5.9 2.0 4.5 7.5 1.0 6.7  11.5  9.3 5.1 7.0 6.3 
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TABLE 1: Panel B 
 
Security Analyst Report Descriptive Statistics  
Percentages of Reports Containing Selected Data Organized by Type of Recommendation 
 
  Strong Buy  Buy  Hold  Sell  S_Sell  All  Total 
  Up  Reit  Up Reit  Down  Up Reit  Down  Reit  Down  Down  Up Reit  Down  Sample 
                      
Recommendation Basis                 
Stock  Undervalued  100.0  71.2  100.0  3.0 7.0 0.0 14.7 1.3  0.0 0.0 0.0 99.2  25.3 3.2 40.0 
Stock  Overvalued  0.0  0.0  0.0 2.0 2.3 0.0 0.8 9.1 0.0  100.0  100.0  0.0 1.1  10.4  1.9 
Relatively  Undervalued 100.0  69.7  100.0  7.4 11.6 0.0  4.5  7.8  0.0  0.0  0.0 99.2 23.2 8.8 39.3 
Relatively  Overvalued  0.0  2.0  0.0 1.4 6.7 0.0 7.4 9.1  100.0  100.0  100.0  0.0 3.6  12.0  3.7 
Revenues (Inc)  39.6  46.0  36.9  64.5  11.6  0.0  6.6  13.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  38.2  40.4  12.0  36.7 
Revenues  (Dec)  0.0 1.5 3.6 1.4 9.3 0.0 4.5 40.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 2.4 28.0  5.0 
Earnings (Inc)  62.4  42.9  54.1  24.3  23.3  0.0  5.3  9.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  58.4  23.0  13.6  30.2 
Earnings  (Dec)  0.0 0.0 3.6 5.1  23.3 0.0 6.6 19.5 0.0  100.0  0.0 1.5 4.2 22.4  5.6 
Product Intro (Pos)  26.2  17.2  18.0  20.9  7.0  0.0  8.6  3.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  22.5  15.8  4.8  16.1 
Product  Intro  (Neg)  0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.3 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 3.2 0.9 
New  Projects  (Pos)  13.4 9.6 8.1 12.8 7.0  0.0 10.7 10.4 0.0  0.0  0.0 11.1 11.4 8.8 11.0 
New  Projects  (Neg)  0.0 0.0 0.9 1.0 2.3 0.0 1.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 2.4 0.9 
Cost  Efficiencies  39.6 21.2 24.3 15.2 11.6 50.0 19.7 13.0  0.0  0.0  50.0 33.2 18.5 12.8 21.3 
Cost  Inefficiencies  2.0  7.6 10.8 18.9 11.6 0.0  12.7 19.5  0.0 33.3 0.0 5.7.0 13.8 16.8 12.2 
Expectations  Met  37.6  29.3  10.8 33.1 30.2 0.0  37.3 31.2  0.0  0.0 100.0  26.0 33.5 31.2 31.5 
Expectations Not Met  9.4  7.1  29.7  7.8  18.6  0.0  11.9  19.5  0.0  66.7  0.0  17.9  8.9  20.0  12.2 
M&A Activity (Pos)  28.9  10.6  21.6  13.5  18.6  0.0  6.6  9.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  25.6  10.4  12.0  14.1 
M&A  Activity  (Neg)  0.0 0.5 1.8 0.3 2.3 0.0 2.5 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.1 5.6 1.5 
Repurchases  (Pos)  17.4 7.1 14.4 9.1  7.0 50.0 17.6 14.3 0.0  0.0  0.0 16.4 11.4 11.2 12.5 
Repurchases  (Neg)  0.0 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 2.4 0.4 
Industry Climate (Pos)  24.2  12.1  18.9  11.1  9.3  50.0  4.5  3.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  22.1  9.2  5.6  11.8 
Industry Climate (Neg)  3.4  7.1  8.1  5.1  7.0  0.0  7.4  15.6  0.0  66.7  50.0  5.3  6.5  14.4  7.1 
Management  (Pos)  37.6 15.7 25.2 27.4  7.0  50.0  4.1  22.1  0.0  0.0  50.0 32.4 16.6 16.8 20.3 
Management  (Neg)  0.0  1.0  0.0 0.7 7.0 0.0 1.6 7.8 0.0  66.7  50.0  0.0 1.1 9.6 1.8 
International Ops (Pos)  19.5  9.6  11.7  32.1  4.7  0.0  5.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  16.0  17.2  1.6  15.2 
International Ops (Neg)  2.7  1.0  2.7  2.0  9.3  0.0  7.0  15.6  0.0  33.3  0.0  2.7  3.4  13.6  4.4 
Leverage  (Pos)  11.4  4.0 4.5 7.4 7.0 0.0 2.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 4.9 4.8 5.7 
Leverage  (Neg)  4.7 2.5 0.9 3.7 2.3 0.0 7.4 10.4 0.0 33.3  0.0 3.1 4.7 8.0 4.7 
Competition  (Pos)  15.4 6.6 3.6 17.9 4.7  0.0  2.5  7.8  0.0  0.0  0.0 10.3 9.9  6.4  9.6 
Competition  (Neg)  4.0 4.0 3.6 2.4 7.0 50.0 9.4 10.4 0.0 33.3  0.0 4.2 5.1 9.6 5.4 
Risk  (Pos)  17.4  8.6 2.7 6.8 11.6 0.0  0.8  6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 5.3  8.0 6.9 
Risk  (Neg)  7.4  4.0  2.7 5.7 7.0 0.0 4.9  20.8  0.0  66.7  50.0  5.3 5.0  17.6  6.5 
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TABLE 1: Panel C 
 
Security Analyst Report Descriptive Statistics  
Model Variables 
 
  Strong Buy  Buy  Hold  Sell  S_Sell  All  Total 
  Up  Reit  Up  Reit Down  Up  Reit Down Reit Down  Down  Up  Reit Down  Sample 
                 
                 
Model Variables                  
EARN_REV  4.1 -4.4 4.0 2.4 -7.3 0.0 -5.9 -4.5 2.5  -12.1  118.8  4.1 -2.1 -3.6 -1.0 
TGT_REV  13.8  1.0 5.5 2.7 -7.0 0.0 1.0 -7.5 0.0 NA  -14.7  11.7  1.9 -7.3 2.8 
STR_ARG  5.6 3.4 3.8 2.5 0.6 1.5 0.7 -0.6  -1.0  -7.0  -1.5 4.8 2.1 -0.3 2.5 
UND_HLD  1.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.4 0.5 1.4 0.9 1.4 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.4 
CAR  4.7 0.3 4.1 0.8 -7.0  10.0  -1.1  -6.4 2.2 -8.7 2.1 4.5 0.0 -6.6 0.3 
                 
                 
 
 
Notes to table 1: All numbers presented are percentages unless otherwise noted.  The estimates for the model variables, EARN_REV, TGT_REV, STR_ARG, UND_HLD, and 
CAR are means of the respective variables not percentages.  They are defined as follows: EARN_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected earnings forecast for 
firm j at time t computed as [(earnings forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time t-1) – 1]; TGT_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at 
time t computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t-1) – 1]; STR_ARGj,t = a variable computed by aggregating the number of positive remarks less the number of 
negative remarks related to 16 specific criteria: value, relative value, sales growth, earnings growth, new product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, expectations 
met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, industry climate, management, international operations, leverage, competition, and risk; UND_HLDj,t =  a variable taking 
on the value 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s brokerage and the firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if 








The Market’s Reaction to the Release of a Security Analyst Report: Regression Results on  




Sign  (1)    (2)    (2A)    (3)    (4)    (4A)    (5)    (5A)   
INTERCEPT ?  -0.0029    -0.0044      -0.0018   -0.0009      -0.0120     
   (-0.78)    (-1.12)      (-0.40)   (-0.18)      (-1.57)     
EARN_REV +  0.0545  ***           0.0804 **     0.0666 **    
    (2.81)            (2.27)      (1.89)     
UP_GR +      0.0517 ***        0.0283 **     0.0123     
       (6.40)         (2.24)      (0.92)     
DOWN_GR -      -0.0850 ***        -0.0494 ***     -0.0321 **    
       (-7.31)         (-3.09)      (-1.93)     
Upgrade (α 0+α 2)  +        0.0473 ***        0.0274 **     -0.0076  
          (44.84)         (5.52)      (0.20)  
Downgrade (α 0+α 3)  -        -0.0894 ***        -0.0503 ***     -0.0520 *** 
          (66.77)         (11.09)      (9.38)  
TGT_REV +           0.3191 ***  0.2552 ***     0.2213 ***    
             (9.34)   (7.06)      (5.99)     
STR_ARG  +                    0.0080 ***    
                      (3.59)     
UND_HLD  -                    -0.0017     
                      (-0.25)     
Adjusted R
2   0.0112  ***  0.1382 ***     0.1799 ***  0.2193 ***     0.2408 ***    
   (7.91)    (56.40)      (87.21)   (28.38)      (21.62)     
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Notes to table 2:  This table presents the results of estimating the following regression using ordinary least squares:  CARj,t = α 0 + α 1EARN_REVj,t + α 2UP_GRj,t +  
α 3DOWN_GRj,t + α 4TGT_REVj,t + α 5 STR_ARGj,t + α 6 UND_HLDj,t + ε j,t where the variables are defined as follows: CARj,t = five-day market adjusted cumulative abnormal 
return for firm j centered on the report release date t; EARN_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected earnings forecast for firm j at time t computed as [(earnings 
forecast at time t / earnings forecast at time t-1) – 1]; UP_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation 
has been upgraded, 0 otherwise; DOWN_GRj,t = a variable taking on the value 1 for reports issued for firm j at time t that indicates the analyst’s recommendation has been 
downgraded, 0 otherwise; TGT_REVj,t = percentage change in the analyst’s projected price target for firm j at time t computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t-1) – 
1]; STR_ARGj,t = a variable computed  aggregating the number of positive remarks less the number of negative remarks related to 16 specific criteria: value, relative value, sales 
growth, earnings growth, new product introductions, new projects, cost efficiencies, expectations met, mergers and acquisitions, repurchase programs, industry climate, 
management, international operations, leverage, competition, and risk; UND_HLDj,t =  a variable taking on the value 0 if no relationship between the analyst’s brokerage and the 
firm exists, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has current holdings; ε j,t = assumed 
normally distributed error term with zero mean and constant variance.  t-statistics are below the estimated coefficients.  F-statistics are below the adjusted R
2 and the aggregated 
coefficient estimates in columns 2A, 4A and 5A.  * one-tailed probability < 0.10; ** one-tailed probability < 0.05; *** one-tailed probability < 0.01; 
† two-tailed probability < 0.10; 
†† two-tailed probability < 0.05; 










The Market Reaction to the Release of a Security Analyst Report: 
The Effects of Recommendation Revision Type 
 
  Reiterations Upgrades  Downgrades 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign Coefficient  t-stat 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient  F-stat 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient  F-stat 
                             
Intercept ?  γ 0  -0.0284 
† (-1.86)                 
Upgrade          +  γ 0 + γ 2  0.0936  *** (7.63)         
Downgrade                  -  γ 0 + γ 3  0.0008   (0.00) 
EARN_REV +  γ 1  0.0309   (0.81)  +   γ 1 + γ 7  0.1132   (0.59)  +  γ 1 + γ 8  0.1659  ** (2.74) 
TGT_REV + γ 4  0.1889  *** (4.27)  +   γ 4 + γ 9  0.0600   (0.48)  +   γ 4 + γ 10  0.3841  *** (13.09) 
STR_ARG + γ 5  0.0102  *** (4.16)  +  γ 5 + γ 11  -0.0117  ** (3.83)  +  γ 5 + γ 12  0.0149  ** (3.21) 
UND_HLD -  γ 6  0.0003   (0.03)  -  γ 6 + γ 13  0.0053   (0.14)  -  γ 6 + γ 14  -0.0251  * (1.92) 
                            
Adjusted R
2 0.2847  ***                        
F-stat (12.09)                            
N 390                            
 
 
Notes to table 3: This table presents the results of estimating the following regression using ordinary least squares:  CARj,t = γ 0 + γ 1EARN_REVj,t + γ 2UP_GRj,t + γ 3DOWN_GRj,t + 
γ 4TGT_REVj,t + γ 5 STR_ARGj,t + γ 6 UND_HLDj,t + γ 7EARN_REVj,t * UP_GRj,t + γ 8EARN_REVj,t * DOWN_GRj,t  + γ 9TGT_REVj,t * UP_GRj,t + γ 10TGT_REVj,t * DOWN_GRj,t    
+ γ 11STR_ARGj,t * UP_GRj,t + γ 12STR_ARGj,t * DOWN_GRj,t + γ 13UND_HLDj,t * UP_GRj,t + γ 14UND_HLDj,t * DOWN_GRj,t  + ξ j,t.  See notes to table 2 for variable definitions.  
t-statistics are to the right of the estimated reiteration coefficients.  F-statistics are to the right of the aggregated coefficient estimates for upgrades and downgrades.  The adjusted 
R
2 and associated F-statistic is for the entire regression in equation 2.  * one-tailed probability < 0.10; ** one-tailed probability < 0.05; *** one-tailed probability < 0.01;  
† two-tailed probability < 0.10; 
†† two-tailed probability < 0.05; 




TABLE 4: Panel A 
Percentage of Reports Achieving 12-Month Price Targets by Recommendation Type 
 
  
    Target Achieved In:   
 Target 
Achieved 
1 to 3 
Months 
4 to 6 
Months 
7 to 9 
Months 
10 to 12 
Months N 
All   54.28  30.81  13.21  5.62  4.64  818 
     Upgrades  57.37  25.50  17.13  7.17  7.57  251 
     Reiterations  50.72  30.93  11.55  5.15  3.09  485 
     Downgrades  65.85  46.34  10.98  3.66  4.88  82 
         
Strong Buy  45.12 17.99 17.07  4.57  5.49  328 
     Upgrades  50.00  16.43  20.00  7.14  6.43  140 
     Reiterations  41.49  19.15  14.89  2.66  4.79  188 
         
Buy   57.14  35.48  11.67  7.38  2.62  420 
     Upgrades  66.97  36.70  13.76  11.93  4.59  109 
     Reiterations  54.81  36.67  10.00  6.30  1.85  270 
     Downgrades  46.34  24.39  17.07  2.44  2.44  41 
         
Hold    77.61  61.2 4.48 7.46 4.48  67 
     Upgrades  50.00  50.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  2 
     Reiterations  73.08  53.85  3.85  11.54  3.85  26 
     Downgrades  84.62  69.23  5.13  5.13  5.13  39 
         
Sell  100.00 100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 1 
     Reiterations  100.00  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1 
         
Strong Sell  100.00  50.00 0.00  0.00 50.00  2 









TABLE 4: Panel B 




Missed  N 
Target 
Achieved  N 
Full 
Sample  N 
            
All   84.38 374  137.27 444  113.09  818 
   Upgrades  88.05  107  130.86  144  112.61  251 
   Reiterations  82.50  239  140.07  246  111.70  485 
   Downgrades  86.37  28  141.59  54  122.74  82 
            
Strong Buy   83.20 181  129.30 147  103.86  328 
   Upgrades  87.20  71  127.53  69  107.08  140 
   Reiterations  80.61  110  130.86  78  101.46  188 
            
Buy   85.21 179  141.43 241  117.47  420 
   Upgrades  90.39  35  133.34  74  119.55  109 
   Reiterations  83.61  122  146.48  148  118.07  270 
   Downgrades  85.83  22  133.54  19  107.94  41 
            
Hold   89.00 14  141.76 53  130.74  67 
   Upgrades  66.51  1  176.95  1  121.73  2 
   Reiterations  92.75  7  128.37  19  118.78  26 
   Downgrades  88.34  6  148.41  33  139.17  39 
            
Sell  NA NA 131.63 1  131.63  1 
   Reiterations  NA  NA  131.63  1  131.63  1 
            
Strong Sell   NA NA 105.64 2  105.64  2 










Percentage of Reports Achieving 12-Month Price Targets by Valuation Methodology 
 
           
    Target Achieved In:   
 Target 
Achieved 
1 to 3 
Months 
4 to 6 
Months 
7 to 9 
Months 
10 to 12 
Months 
N  
           
All           
   Earnings Multiples  54.24  30.87  13.16  6.64  3.57  813   
   DCF Variations  51.37  23.85  16.51  6.42  4.59  109   
   Asset Multiples  45.46  22.73  10.10  8.08  4.55  198   
   Other  33.33  19.45  5.56  5.56  2.78  36   
           
Upgrades           
   Earnings Multiples  57.43  25.70  17.27  10.44  4.02  249   
   DCF Variations  52.78  11.11  25.00  13.89  2.78  36   
   Asset Multiples  59.32  22.03  22.03  8.47  6.78  59   
   Other  42.86  14.29  0.00  28.57  0.00  7   
           
Reiterations           
   Earnings Multiples  50.62  30.91  11.41  5.19  3.11  482   
   DCF Variations  45.61  21.05  14.03  3.51  7.02  57   
   Asset Multiples  37.80  21.26  4.72  8.66  3.15  127   
   Other  20.00  12.00  4.00  0.00  4.00  25   
           
Downgrades           
   Earnings Multiples  65.85  46.34  10.98  3.66  4.87  82   
   DCF Variations  68.75  62.50  6.25  0.00  0.00  16   
   Asset Multiples  58.33  41.67  8.33  0.00  8.33  12   
   Other  100.00  75.00  25.00  0.00  0.00  4   
           
 
 
 
 